Well, the Senate hearings yielded some remarkable testimony, from both the witnesses, as well as Senators Specter and Hatch.
Before I launch into my notes, let me say one thing that should be the take-away from my blog. The Judiciary Committee needs to appoint a special prosecutor ASAP to examine the situation described by Gary Aguirre, that took place at the SEC. His testimony was explosive, and has to be investigated. Now. If true, the SEC is too rotten to do the job it is chartered with, and that needs to be assessed, and dealt with immediately. Please take out a moment and send your email or fax to Senators Hatch and Specter calling for a special prosecutor. Do it now, and be a part of taking corrective steps - for the good of the market, and for self-protection.
Also worth noting was that most of the Committee was NOT in evidence, a testament to the difference between Congress in the 1930s, when the Pecora hearings revealed a Wall Street literally riddled with corruption and fraud, and today, where allegations that the SEC is engaging in obstruction of justice doesn't warrant skipping whatever else the Committee members were busy doing.
I missed the first 10 or so minutes, so I'll pick up where I tuned in, which was at the beginning of Blumenthal's testimony.
Now to my notes.
Gary Aguirre single handedly ended the existence of the SEC as we know it with his testimony, IMO - if his charges are true, he is describing influence peddling, obstruction of justice, collusion, and wholesale abuse of the public trust. In his testimony and the ensuing responses to questions directed at him, he detailed his insider trading investigation being shut down due to the political clout of the person suspected of passing insider information, he talked about his supervisor throwing a spreadsheet at him, about interference on a Commission-wide basis, about gross negligence and active collusion to obstruct justice on an institutional basis, about being terminated for being too effective in uncovering a Wall Street fraud. A believable, methodical, considered description of the co-opting of our regulator. He was composed, and his factual exposure of the evidence was all the more stunning for its matter-of-fact quality.
Marc Kasowitz detailed precisely how a short and distort scheme works, and described the damage that is done to the market when hedge funds scheme to manipulate the market using research firms and the media to disseminate false and misleading information, so that their short positions can generate greater financial results.
Compelling testimony came from Demetrios Anifantis, who, from an experience-based perspective, described how the firm he had worked for, Camelback/Gradient, would misrepresent the experience of the firm’s analysts, would want to know whether the client was long or short before they wrote their report, etc. He described a hatchet-job-for-hire firm. In the Q&A phase, he re-iterated his experiences - and Hatch seemed very keen on the name change from Camelback to Gradient.
CT AG Blumenthal was very political, but sent the clear and direct message that if the SEC didn’t do its job, they could expect that the states would.
Hatch plainly said that Reg SHO had failed to curb naked short selling, and that it had further put in place no meaningful penalties to curb the practice. He mentioned the grandfathering of all prior fails as an example where the SEC was acting in conflict with the public interests.
The Department of Justice waffled, and brought up a case brought against Bayou for screwing their investors – a straightforward fraud case – as the only example he could think of where hedge funds had been targeted. Specter got that pretty loud and clear.
Specter directed Biosite CEO Kim Blickenstaff to file a complaint with the Dept. of Justice in his company’s conflict with Sterling Research.
Specter additionally said that he found that civil fines, with no admission of guilt, were suspect, and usually designed to end matters before they got really uncomfortable for the perp. He seemed pretty intent upon taking this issue to the criminal level.
Hatch made the statement that naked short selling seemed like it was a big problem, and that regulators didn’t seem to be doing much to solve it, and that the states were important in this battle.
Specter said that he felt that this matter was of enormous importance, and felt that they were dealing with a topic that could destabilize the markets, and that his feeling was that jail sentences would be a good deterrent.
Hatch asked a number of questions regarding registering stock on foreign exchanges to avoid reporting the naked short selling thresholds.
The over-arching tone of the concluding statements was that what was being described was fraud, and that the Judiciary Committee was very concerned with the pervasiveness, the lack of registration or regulation of the hedge funds believed to be involved in this, the obvious fraudulent aspects of the manipulative devices, and the systemic risk posed as a result of the leverage that the bad apple firms could bring to bear – and the damage that leverage could cause if and when some of them blew up.
Hatch, referring to Rocker and SAC and Chanos, said "A number of invited witnesses declined to appear. We have the authority to compel testimony if necessary."
Owen Lamont gave a canned, shorts are good for your bones and teeth shpiel that avoided any of the allegations before the committee, and further used the post hoc reasoning that because some of the firms that had complained about short sellers were later shown to be frauds, that they should all be considered in that light. Completely expected and predicted.
All in all, the testimony supported the idea of a regulator co-opted by those they police, an industry run amok, large, anonymous pools of money behaving in criminal ways, and research firms violating every possible trust, for the almighty buck.
Pretty much what you would have gotten by reading this blog over the last year.
Did I miss anything of import? Please update me with the comments – I’m going by my real-time notes.
What were your impressions?
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If you haven't downloaded it yet, be sure to read the Intro chapter to my non-fiction book on the markets, Symphony of Greed - Financial Terrorism and Super-Crime on Wall Street.
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Testimony of
Mr. Matthew Friedrich
Chief of Staff and Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division
United States Department of Justice
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1972&wit_id=5386
Testimony of
The Honorable Richard Blumenthal
Attorney General
State of Connecticut
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1972&wit_id=4954
Testimony of
Mr. Gary J. Aguirre
Former Investigator
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1972&wit_id=5485
Testimony of
Mr. Marc E. Kasowitz
Senior Partner
Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP, Alliance for Investment Transparency
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1972&wit_id=5486
Testimony of
Mr. Joseph McLaughlin
Partner
Sidley Austin LLP, Managed Funds Association
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1972&wit_id=5487
Testimony of
Mr. Kim D. Blickenstaff
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Biosite, Inc.
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1972&wit_id=5488
Testimony of
Professor Owen A. Lamont
Professor of Finance
Yale School of Management
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1972&wit_id=5489
Testimony of
Mr. Demetrios Anifantis
Former Client Relationship Manager
Camelback Research Alliance, Inc
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1972&wit_id=5490
Testimony of
Dr. Howard Schilit, CPA
Founder and Non-Executive Chair
Center for Financial Research and Analysis (CFRA, LLC)
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1972&wit_id=5491
Testimony of
Mr. Jonathan Boersma
Director, Standards of Practice
CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1972&wit_id=5492